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RECENT DECISIONS
after the breach. These considerations assume added importance in
this jurisdiction because of the great number of lakeside vacation
cottages, which, normally, have a rental value during the vacation sea-
son, and are virtually unrentable for the rest of the year, but are likely
subjects for longer leases due to the present housing shortage.
Such considerations would help prevent the inequitable result of
the instant case where the tenant occupied premises which had a rental
value of $45-00 per week during the nine weeks of his occupancy, for
which he had promised to pay $37.00 per month for a year, but actually
paying only a total of $74.00. The landlord occupied the premises dur-
ing the period when the property was unrentable.' 4
WILLIAm A. RITCHAY
Torts-Human Intervening Force as Breaking the Chain of Causation
- Plaintiff was driving an automobile on highway 12 in Minnesota
and defendant Butler was riding with him as a passenger in the front
seat. Defendant Knudsen in his car was directly behind plaintiff on
the highway. Knudsen attempted to pass plaintiff and turned into the
left lane, coming up approximately abreast of the plaintiff's car. A
cattle truck was approaching from the other direction and the highway,
having only two lanes, could not accommodate all three vehicles. In
this perilous position, plaintiff, in order to save himself, turned to the
right in order to get on the shoulder of the road. Defendant Butler,
the passenger, grabbed the wheel and turned the automobile to the left
causing it to go across the highway and into a ditch on the left side of
the road where it rolled over. Plaintiff's automobile touched neither the
truck nor Knudsen's car. Defendant Knudsen contended that the act
of defendant Butler was an efficient intervening force relieving Knud-
sen of any liability. Plaintiff's contention was that the negligence of
Knudsen set in motion a series of events which culminated in the acci-
dent and that the negligence of both defendants proximately contributed
to the damages which he sustained. Held: That the act of defendant
Butler in grabbing the steering wheel and forcing plaintiff's car to the
left across the highway and into the ditch, when defendant Knudsen
was attempting to pass plaintiff's automobile in the face of an oncoming
truck, was an "efficient intervening cause" of the accident, so as to re-
lieve defendant Knudsen from liability for plaintiff's injuries. Robin-
son v. Butler et al., 33 N.W. (2d) 821 (Minnesota, 1948.)
The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated in earlier cases' that in
determining whether an alleged intervening cause is sufficient to re-
lieve the original actor of responsibility the test is this:
'1 See principal case, p. 104.
2 Childs v. Standard Oil Co., 149 Minn. 166 at 170, 182 N.W. 1000 at 1001 (1921).
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"Has an independent, responsible2 agent intervened between the
first wrongdoer and the plaintiff and the continuous sequence of
events been interrupted or turned aside so as to produce a re-
sult which would not otherwise have followed ?"
What is the content of the word "responsible" in defining the nature
of the intervening act? It would seem possible that in this case de-
fendant Butler acted in an emergency or at least in response to a
stimulus, namely the danger he was put in because of Knudsen's act.
As regards this reaction to a stimulus the Restatement of the Law
of Torts states:
"An intervening act of a human being or animal which is a
normal response to the stimulus of a situation created by the
actor's negligent conduct, is not a superseding cause of harm
to another which the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about."
3
The word "normal" in the above quotation is used as the opposite
of "highly extraordinary" and not as meaning "standard" or "un-
usual."4 The reasonableness of the act is not a consideration. It is
enough that the intervening act is other than a highly extraordinary
response to the stimulus. 5
As far back as 1770 an English court considered this problem in
the famous "squib" case, Scott v. Shepherd.6 There the defendant
threw a lighted squib (firecracker) into a market house and it landed
on a merchant's wares. In order to protect himself the merchant threw
it from him and it landed on another merchant's table. The second
merchant also threw it from him and it then hit plaintiff, exploding in
his eyes. The court held that under the circumstances, the merchants'
acts were defendant's acts because they acted for fear of danger to
themselves.
In Stanley v. F. W. Woolworth Co.7 the Court held that where a
plate glass window broke and plaintiff, although not hit by the glass,
was injured by the stampeding crowd, the stampede was a natural re-
sponse to fear caused by defendant's negligence.
If the above theory is to be successfully applied to this case, de-
fendant Butler's act of grabbing the steering wheel and forcing plain-
tiff's car to the left must have been a "normal" response to the fear
or disturbance, the word "normal" being used in the same sense here
2 Italics the author's.
a Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 443.
4 Ibid., Sec. 443 (b).
5 Ibid., Sec. 443 (a).63 Wills K. B. 403 (1770).
7275 N.Y.S. 804, 153 Misc. 665 (1934).
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as above.8 By way of explanation the Restatement of the Law of Torts
says:
"The actor's conduct must be a substantial factor in subjecting
the other to fear or other emotional disturbance. Furthermore,
the act done must be a normal response to the fear or distur-
bance. If after the event, and knowing that the fear or distur-
bance has been created, the act done or its impulsions appear
highly extraordinary it is not a normal response to fear or
disturbance."9
It must be remembered that in determining whether this act was
"normal" or not, the court or jury is looking back at the event and
knows the situation, including the character of the one subjected to the
stimulus, and decides from these facts whether the act was extraor-
dinary or not.10 Under this definition of "normal," as opposed to extra-
ordinary, defendant Butler's act might be considered normal. Certain-
ly he was acting in response to a stimulus of fear caused in the first
instance by Knudsen's act. It might well be argued that this reaction
in a supposed emergency was not an efficient intervening cause, but
merely a reaction to a stimulus, in itself incapable of breaking the chain
of causation.
DANIEL C. CORCORAN
Torts-Right of Privacy-"The Saturday Evening Post" published
an article entitled "Never Give a Passenger a Break." The author,
joined as a defendant, was merciless in his ridicule of taxicab drivers
in Washington, D.C. He pictured them as dishonest opportunists, ever
ready to overcharge a patron not thoroughly familiar with the compli-
cated zone system. The plaintiff was an operator of a taxicab, and her
photograph was used to illustrate the article in question. Plaintiff's
name was not mentioned in the text. She sued for damages for libel
and for a violation of her "right of privacy" by reason of the publica-
tion of the photograph. The case was heard on defendant's motion to
dismiss the complaint on grounds of insufficiency. Held: "Publication
of a photograph of a private person without his sanction, unless by
reason of his position or achievements he has become a public character,
constitutes a violation of the 'right of privacy,' for which an action
for damages will lie." Peay v. Curtis Publishing Company et al, (D.C.,
D.C., 1948) 78 F. Supp. 305; Fowler v. Curtis Publishing Company
et al, (D.C., D.C., 1948) 78 F. Supp. 303.
This decision adds another jurisdiction to the growing weight of
authority that there is such a thing as the "right of privacy," a right
8 Fn. 4, supra.
9 Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 444 (c).
10 Fn. 4,supra.
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